

NomosHandbook



Schramm | Gehrau | Bilandzic | Wunsch [eds.]

# Handbook of Media Use



Nomos

## **Nomos**Handbook

This series publishes outstanding handbooks from the disciplines and research fields of the social sciences and humanities. Renowned experts present the current state of theoretical and methodological research and provide researchers, teachers, students and practitioners with sound basic knowledge from all relevant subject areas. Often designed to be interdisciplinary, the handbooks follow a clear structure and serve as reliable repositories of knowledge, concise reference works and inspiring sources of reference in equal measure.

Holger Schramm | Volker Gehrau  
Helena Bilandzic | Carsten Wunsch [eds.]

# Handbook of **Media Use**



**Nomos**

© Cover picture: istockphoto.com

**The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek** lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>

ISBN 978-3-7560-3317-1 (Print)  
978-3-7489-6251-9 (ePDF)



Online Version  
InLibra

1st Edition 2026

© Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany 2026. Overall responsibility for manufacturing (printing and production) lies with Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.

This work is subject to copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use a fee is payable to “Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort”, Munich.

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Nomos or the editors.

## Preface to the expanded and revised 2nd edition of the English version of the handbook

To understand the structure and authorship of this handbook, we need to look back 15 years. At that time, Nomos Publishing approached the spokespersons of the section “Media Use and Effects Research” of the German Communication Association (DGPK) with the idea to publish a comprehensive handbook on media use and effects research for the German-speaking market. The spokespersons at that time, Holger Schramm and Carsten Wunsch, as well as the previous spokespersons, Helena Bilandzic and Volker Gehrau, were appointed as editors and began the conceptual work.

It was clear that several excellent handbooks already existed on the international market, such as the third edition of “Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research”, published in 2009 and edited by Jennings Bryant and Mary Beth Oliver. However, it quickly became apparent that these volumes predominantly focused on media effects, invariably linked, of course, to the media processes that give rise to these effects. This emphasis is unsurprising, given that since at least the 1990s, modern media effects theories and the nuanced explanation of media outcomes have been inconceivable without considering the diverse processes and experiences involved in media use. The ‘black box’ of media use had become an integral part of media effects research.

What became apparent during our market analysis was that no existing handbook focused specifically and exclusively on the processes of media use while also aiming to provide a comprehensive overview of all related phenomena. It was for this reason that we decided to focus our handbook on precisely this area.

To cover the variety and complexity of media usage processes, the handbook is divided into four sections. The first section takes the basics of media use into account like emotions or actions. The second section looks at different concepts for selecting media offers like moods or motivations. The different processes occurring during media use are part of the third section. The fourth section discusses different aspects of the context of media usage and their impact on media use.

The first edition of our handbook with 26 chapters was published in 2014, and at the beginning of 2025, after more than ten years, the second, updated and greatly expanded edition with 37 chapters was published – still in German.

While preparing the second edition, we recognized that a handbook of this kind was still unavailable on the international market. Many authors also expressed a desire to make their chapters accessible to an international audience in English. Consequently, in the spring 2025, we decided to translate the entire handbook into English to ensure its visibility and availability worldwide. Nomos Publishing, already active in the international book market, enthusiastically supported the idea, and all authors readily agreed to participate.

As the publisher initially provided an AI-generated translation of the handbook, all authors were required to revise it manually. During this process, final updates were also incorporated into the chapters, and the entire revision was completed within six months.

Preface to the expanded and revised 2nd edition of the English version of the handbook

---

Since the handbook was originally launched as a publication project by a German specialist group, the authors naturally come from the German-speaking community, but nonetheless represent and critically synthesize state of the art in international research. Nevertheless, some examples – especially in the book section 4 – mostly but not exclusively refer to the German context.

We have completed a demanding yet highly rewarding process. We are pleased with the path we have taken over the past few months and would like to thank all the authors for their dedicated collaboration. Our special gratitude goes to Nomos Publishing for their trust and support since the first edition, and to Liana Rupp, who carried out the extensive final editing with exceptional diligence. We are confident that this handbook will complement existing volumes in a meaningful and valuable way, and we hope it will serve as an inspiring and insightful resource for many readers.

October 2025

*Holger Schramm, Volker Gehrau, Helena Bilandzic, Carsten Wünsch*

## Preface to the expanded and revised 2nd edition of the German version of the handbook

Ten years have passed since the first edition of the “Handbook of Media Use” was published. In these ten years, a lot has happened in the media world and, accordingly, in media use research. This has prompted us to publish a completely revised and expanded second edition together with old and new authors. Our basic approach and general concept have not changed. The second edition of the handbook also focuses on phenomena that people experience during media use. Aspects of media effects are closely interwoven with reception processes. Nevertheless, we have largely excluded media effects in this handbook in order to provide space for the theories and approaches of reception processes and to decouple them to a certain extent from the typical questions about impact in the context of which they are normally placed. We hope that this will give the important questions of processes in media use sufficient space for discussion and allow them to be considered independently of effects. This should provide the basis for a new, creative theory development within media use research, but also in effects research. After all, modern media effects theories simply cannot do without analysing reception processes: How media content is selected, experienced and processed, what emotional and cognitive processes it triggers – all of these are now integral components of explanations of media effects. Our handbook therefore analyses the processes before and during media use in detail. Accordingly, the new edition is also divided into four sections: I. Foundations of media use, II. Media choice and exposure, III. Media experiences and processes and IV. Contexts of media use.

Changes have been made to the first edition in several respects: Firstly, all chapters of the first edition have been fundamentally revised. In particular, the state of research has been updated and expanded to include new strands of research. Above all, it was necessary in most chapters to take account of new developments in media technologies and offerings, so that social networks on the Internet, algorithmisation, mobile communication, streaming services and much more are now given greater prominence. On the other hand, 13 new chapters have been added compared to the first edition. Interactive media use has also been taken into account in the foundations. Most of the new chapters can be found in the section on media experiences and processes. They deal with framing, ideological processing, nostalgia, inspiration, involvement, credibility, reactance, content generation and cumulative media use. New chapters on mobile media use, permanent connectedness and media use in algorithmic environments have been included in the “Contexts” section.

These expansions offer all interested parties a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of various aspects of media use as well as their prerequisites and contexts. We would like to thank all the authors for their contributions and the fruitful and reliable co-operation, the team at Nomos Publishing for their support and Julia Sophie Spahn for her competent and prudent final editing. We hope that you enjoy reading the “Handbook of Media Use” as much as we enjoyed designing and supervising it.

Summer 2024

*Volker Gehrau, Helena Bilandzic, Holger Schramm and Carsten Wünsch*

## Preface to the 1st edition of the German version of the handbook

The purpose of an academic handbook is to present the state of research within a specific field in a structured and comprehensive manner. This handbook focuses on research about media use and processing. However, it became evident very early in the conceptual development of this volume and throughout a review of the existing literature that the term *media use* encompasses a wide range of interpretations regarding its objects of study and guiding questions.

What unites these diverse approaches is the shared understanding that this research area concerns questions and phenomena relating to encounters with media content. Yet, perspectives differ considerably with regard to how precisely this encounter is defined and whether processes that precede, contextualize, or follow that encounter are also included in the analysis.

One perspective – also adopted in this volume – is reflected in the mission statement of the section “Media Use and Effects Research” of the German Communication Association (DGPUK). Following the established distinction between media use and media effects, the fields in this handbook are clearly distinguished from media effects research, which is primarily concerned with the consequences of media use, often dissociated from the media usage itself. While it is evident that the boundary between media use and media effects cannot always be sharply defined, maintaining this distinction enables a more focused analytical perspective.

Despite this deliberate demarcation from processes that are sometimes far downstream of the actual media encounter, we do not regard media use phenomena as confined solely to the moment of contact. In this respect, we share the section’s broad understanding, which, in addition to processes of perception, experience and interpretation of media messages, also considers questions of attention and the selection of media (content) and their appropriation and integration into one’s own lifeworld to be relevant.

This perspective focuses on the phenomena that occur during media use, yet it remains broad enough to incorporate explanatory and contextual factors. At this point in time, we see a clear need to record the state of research on precisely this subject area within a comprehensive handbook. Following decades of extensive studies and the often eclectic and fragmented treatment of the topic in introductory texts, this volume brings together the diverse strands of research and provides a contemporary, in-depth account of the central theories and empirical findings.

The “Handbook of Media Use” is directed at a broad academic audience from communication science and related disciplines (e.g. sociology, psychology, political science, education), as well as advanced undergraduate and graduate students in these fields. It comprises 26 chapters written by recognised researchers in the field. The volume is organized into four sections: Section 1 lays out the theoretical foundations for media use in general, building on neighbouring disciplines such as psychology and sociology, with their adaptations and developments within communication science. Section 2 addresses both micro- and macro-theoretical aspects that shape attention to and selection of media (content), particularly in the phase preceding actual exposure. Section 3 focuses on concrete phenomena involved in the perception, experience, and processing of media (content). Finally, section

Preface to the 1st edition of the German version of the handbook

---

4 examines the broader social, cultural, and historical contexts within which media use occurs and evolves.

The chapters present the theoretical foundations, tracing their historical roots and summarising the current state of research. Research logic and methods are not the primary focus and are addressed selectively where they appear necessary or helpful for understanding the concept or theory. The individual chapters are designed to provide broad access to the topic, transcending specific communication science “schools” and paradigmatic approaches. In addition to standard references, three to five suggestions for further reading are provided at the end of each chapter. These will guide readers seeking to explore the foundations of the topic, while also offering pathways for those wishing to explore the subject in greater depth beyond the scope of a handbook contribution

June 2013

*Carsten Wünsch, Holger Schramm, Volker Gehrau, Helena Bilandzic*

## Table of Contents

List of Figures .....	15
List of Tables .....	17
<b>I. Foundations of media use</b>	
I.1 Cognitive foundations of processing media content ..... <i>Jörg Matthes and Sarah Juricek</i>	21
I.2 Emotional foundations of media use ..... <i>Werner Wirth</i>	39
I.3 Motivational and behavioural foundations of media use ..... <i>Denise Sommer and Viktoria Heyer</i>	59
I.4 Foundations of interactive media use ..... <i>Daniel Possler, Anna Sophie Kümpel and Christoph Klimmt</i>	79
<b>II. Media choice and exposure</b>	
II.1 Media use in everyday life ..... <i>Ralph Weiß</i>	101
II.2 Diffusion and appropriation of media technologies ..... <i>Stephan Niemand and Maren Hartmann</i>	121
II.3 Motivation and media choice ..... <i>Marco Dohle</i>	139
II.4 Attitudes and media choice ..... <i>Merja Mahrt</i>	159
II.5 Mood and media choice ..... <i>Holger Schramm</i>	177
II.6 Personality and media choice ..... <i>Andreas Fahr</i>	193
<b>III. Media experiences and processes</b>	
III.1 Judgement and evaluation processes in media use ..... <i>Christian Schemer, Klara Langmann and Luisa Gehle</i>	213

Table of Contents

---

III.2	Framing processes in media use .....	233
	<i>Sophie Lecheler and Svenja Schäfer</i>	
III.3	Ideological and motivated processing in media use .....	251
	<i>Anja Kalch and Helena Bilandzic</i>	
III.4	Processes of comprehension in media use .....	271
	<i>Stephan Schwan</i>	
III.5	Emotions and meta-emotions in media use .....	291
	<i>Anne Bartsch and Freya Sukalla</i>	
III.6	Memories and nostalgia in media use .....	311
	<i>Tim Wulf</i>	
III.7	Suspense in media use .....	331
	<i>Matthias R. Hastall</i>	
III.8	Inspiration from media use .....	351
	<i>Diana Rieger</i>	
III.9	Aesthetic experience in media use .....	371
	<i>Monika Suckfüll</i>	
III.10	Immersive experience in media use .....	389
	<i>Helena Bilandzic</i>	
III.11	Involvement processes in media use .....	409
	<i>Zoe Olbermann, Fabian Mayer and Holger Schramm</i>	
III.12	Parasocial interactions in media use .....	425
	<i>Nicole Liebers-Trappe and Uli Gleich</i>	
III.13	Empathy, identification and social comparison in media use .....	443
	<i>Carsten Wünsch</i>	
III.14	Realism and reality in narrative processing .....	465
	<i>Özen Odağ</i>	
III.15	Credibility and trust in media use .....	479
	<i>Thomas Koch and Magdalena Obermaier</i>	
III.16	Reactance and resistance in media use .....	497
	<i>Ulrike Schwertberger and Brigitte Naderer</i>	
III.17	Media use and content generation .....	517
	<i>Teresa K. Naab and Anna Schnauber-Stockmann</i>	
III.18	Cumulative media use .....	531
	<i>Daniela Schlütz</i>	

**IV. Contexts of media use**

IV.1	Media use in international comparisons .....	551
	<i>Uwe Hasebrink</i>	
IV.2	Media use and practice in communities and for communitisation .....	571
	<i>Andreas Hepp and Philip Sinner</i>	
IV.3	Media use in a historical context .....	591
	<i>Stefanie Aeverbeck-Lietz and Simon Sax</i>	
IV.4	Media use in different phases of life .....	617
	<i>Elizabeth Prommer and Christine Linke</i>	
IV.5	Media use with disabilities .....	635
	<i>Anne Haage</i>	
IV.6	Media use in social groups .....	655
	<i>Volker Gehrau</i>	
IV.7	Media use with mobile devices .....	675
	<i>Veronika Karnowski</i>	
IV.8	Media use in the context of permanent connectedness .....	691
	<i>Leonard Reinecke and Alicia Gilbert</i>	
IV.9	Media use in algorithmic environments .....	707
	<i>Anna Sophie Kümpel</i>	
	List of authors .....	725
	Index .....	731

## I.1

# Cognitive foundations of processing media content

*Jörg Matthes and Sarah Juricek*

**Abstract** | A central prerequisite for understanding media reception and media effects is knowledge of the human information-processing system. This chapter introduces the key cognitive processes involved in media use and illustrates them with current research findings. It describes how humans think and make sense of entertainment and informational media content, highlighting processes such as perception, attention, as well as the processing, storage, and retrieval of information. Overall, the chapter shows that perception is selective and constrained: not all available information can be processed and stored. Even when information is perceived, people have only limited capacity to process, store, and retrieve it. This chapter thus provides the foundation for a deeper understanding of the cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioural effects of media.

**Keywords** | cognition, information processing, perception, information intake, memory

## 1 Introduction: Why do we deal with cognition?

When we use media, we are confronted with a flood of information: an endless stream of images, a complex interplay of voices, sounds, cuts, music, and noise. With digital media – accessible anytime through omnipresent smartphones – this connection to the social and political environment has become constant (Koban et al., 2023). How is it, then, that we generally do not find this mass of information exhausting? How does our information-processing system succeed in categorising and storing media input in a meaningful way, allowing us to later recall what we have seen, read, or heard? Can we truly absorb unlimited amounts of information, and how do we allocate our attention? Why do we perceive and remember some information while other content is ignored or forgotten? These questions form the starting point for the study of cognitive processes in media use. This includes examining how people think and make sense of entertainment and informational media content, as well as the related processes of perception, attention, information processing, and storage. The very nature of these questions already suggests that such processes do not operate in isolation but interact within a complex system of stages and mechanisms.

The following chapter introduces basic cognitive processes and thus forms the prelude to dealing with reception processes in modern media environments. Building on this, concepts and processes such as involvement (→ III.10 Immersive experience in media use and → III.11 Involvement processes in media use), judgement formation and judgement heuristics (→ III.1 Judgement and evaluation processes in media use), tension (→ III.7 Suspense in media use) or narrative and news reception (→ III.4 Processes of comprehension in media use) are excluded here for the time being. In the following, we will deal with the most important cognitive foundations of media reception and illustrate them with examples

and current research findings. Before we turn our attention to central concepts and phenomena such as perception, attention and information processing, we will begin with the most important theoretical foundations.

## 2. Theoretical foundations of cognitive processes in media reception

### 2.1 Definition of cognition

In simple terms, cognition refers to the entirety of the information-processing processes and structures of an intelligent system (cf. e.g. Kluwe, 2001; Wirth, 1997). This includes a range of aspects such as perception, attention, memory, thinking, problem solving, language processing and language production. All of these processes are closely linked. Cognition can generally be thought of as a process that describes several sequences between an internal or external stimulus and a reaction caused by it. In relation to media use, a cognitive perspective attempts to explain how people perceive, absorb, process, store and retrieve information when interacting with media.

### 2.2 Basic Model of the Cognitive System

Since the so-called cognitive turn in the 1970s, the human cognitive system has been described in basic psychological research by analogy to a computer that can record, process and store information and whose 'computing power' is limited. The starting point for almost all psychological models of the human cognitive system is therefore the assumption that the environment of an organism can be mapped and stored as an internal representation. The cognitive system is understood as an information-processing system that receives information through its sensory organs, converts it into internal representations, processes it, changes it, and can reproduce it. The processing of the perceived information – for example a television message – always takes place on the basis of previously stored information or previously available knowledge or existing predispositions of the recipient (Lang, 2000; Wirth, 1999).

Even on the basis of this simplified idea, it becomes clear that internal representations are not a simple reflection of the surrounding information. There are at least two reasons for this: Firstly, the cognitive system works highly selectively. This is primarily due to the fact that our resources for absorbing and processing information are limited, as will be explained in more detail later. This means that only a small proportion of the information we receive is actually taken into account and processed (Lang, 2000). Secondly, the processing of the incoming information and the internal representation depend considerably on the current state of the cognitive system – i.e. our prior knowledge, attitudes, moods, emotions or our cognitive workload.

Fig. I.1.1 shows the basic model of the cognitive system according to Wickens et al. (2004), which can also be found in a similar form by other authors (Anderson, 2001; Kluwe, 2001; Lang, 2000). The model consists of several basic components: (1) the sensory system, which maps sensory information available for a few hundred milliseconds; (2) the activation of information through perception; (3) the

working memory, which contains the information that is “conscious” at a certain point in time; (4) the long-term memory as a permanent knowledge store and (5) the selection and execution of reactions.




Fig. I.1.1: Basic Model of the Cognitive System, source: own illustration based on Wickens et al., 2004

The diagram shows a typical information processing sequence (Lang, 2000; Wickens et al., 2004; Wirth 1997). In a first step, the sensory system receives auditory, visual, olfactory, or haptic stimuli. Although this sensory system has a very high capacity, these stimuli are only available for a short time. Through the process of selective attention, part of this sensory information is selected for further processing. Only this part then reaches the perceptual system. The perceived information can be compared with the knowledge from the long-term memory. This gives meaning to the incoming information.

This can lead to two different processes: Firstly, both the incoming information and information from the long-term memory can be transferred to the working memory. This is where the information is processed in the form of thoughts or decisions. At the end of this process, a reaction is selected or executed. In addition, the information can be stored in long-term memory. For example, recipients register a large amount of advertising information when watching an advertising block in the cinema. Some of this information enters the perceptual system, for example information about the flavour of a new soft drink. This information is categorised against the background of existing knowledge about soft drinks and stored in the memory. Depending on the situation and the difficulty of the information, recipients can invest a few or many attention resources in this process. Ultimately, they come to the decision to try the drink and, if necessary, do so later (Lang, 2000; Wickens et al., 2004; Wirth 1997).

Secondly, a direct response selection and execution can take place without further processing in working memory. These would be *automatic reactions* and actions that recipients do not think about further. For example, the brand image of advertising messages can also be improved unnoticed

without recipients realising this and without them investing cognitive resources (see e.g. Schemer et al., 2008). The so-called implicit judgement formation also describes such a process (→ III.1 Judgement and evaluation processes in media use).

To summarise, the model shows all the important key points in the information processing process, which we will look at in more detail below. The key feature of this simple model is that the processes in this model do not always have to run from left to right. Instead, the process can be started at any point in the model.

### 3. Information intake: Perception and attention

#### 3.1 Perception

Perception is a fundamental process in the human organism that has developed over the course of evolution. It includes not only haptic, visual, auditory, olfactory or gustatory stimuli, but also the perception of body, language and time (for a comprehensive overview, see Hagendorf et al., 2011). Not everything is relevant for reception research. What is crucial here is the fundamental observation that perceptual processes operate largely independently from conscious, deliberate intervention; they proceed quickly and thus enable optimal adaptation to the physical environment. In contrast, thought processes are relatively slow and also accessible to conscious control (cf. Lang, 2000; Wirth, 1997). In addition, it has already been established above that human perception does not produce an image of the environment in the sense of a physically accurate reflection.

Humans only have a limited number of sensory organs at their disposal. This means that not all physical stimuli can be perceived. In addition to the limited capacity of the sensory organs, there is another reason why we cannot perceive all stimuli: the *attention* with which we view our surroundings (such as media messages).

#### 3.2 Attention

As a rule, two central functions of attention are distinguished (Neisser, 1974; cf. Wirth, 2001): Firstly, the selection of relevant information from an abundance of stimuli and secondly, the comparison of incoming information with existing knowledge so that meaning can be generated from a flood of stimuli. Attention is usually understood as an interplay between the *voluntary directing* of attention to environmental stimuli and the *involuntary generation of attention* through environmental stimuli.

When using media, we can direct our attention to a news message and categorise and store the information conveyed against the background of existing knowledge (see the basic model of the cognitive system in Fig. I.1.1). This is called *controlled attention* (Kahnemann, 1973; Neisser, 1974; cf. Wirth, 2001). These require cognitive capacities. However, they can be automated through constant repetition so that they run faster and with less cognitive effort at a later point in time. For example, players of computer games have to concentrate strongly on the key stimuli (such as the appearance of an opponent) at the beginning of a new game. After appropriate practice, this is no longer necessary,

so that players can react automatically and without strong voluntary effort. In the other case, we are confronted with advertisements on television that suddenly show images that we find interesting (e.g. beautiful landscapes). As a result, we direct our attention to the content of the advertisement – as a reaction to the advertising stimuli. This falls under the heading of *automatic attention*. Although we are aware of involuntary attention processes, they are uncontrolled and are triggered by external stimuli. This means that our attention is involuntarily aroused by stimuli or objects, such as colours, movements or sounds. These stimuli attract our attention without us being able to consciously control them. Voluntary and involuntary attention are often referred to as top-down or bottom-up (cf. Neisser, 1974). *Top-down processing* describes information processing that is controlled by the recipient's prior knowledge, expectations or attitudes. *Bottom-up processing* describes data-led information processing that is oriented towards the stimulus. While bottom-up processing is automatic and fast, and enables the perception of several stimuli at the same time, top-down processing is more time-consuming, more effortful and runs sequentially, not in parallel (cf. Chun & Wolfe, 2005). In addition, humans have so-called latent attentional dispositions that are activated when we are confronted with certain stimuli. For example, if we are generally very interested in the topic of childcare due to our personal situation, we are more likely to notice this topic relevant to our current tasks and goals on television than if we are less interested, even if we are only following the events on the screen in passing (cf. Roda, 2011).

If we follow the stimuli during controlled attention, how can we distinguish the important from the unimportant from the flood of information during media reception? To answer this question, three mechanisms are usually put forward (cf. Wirth, 2001):

- Firstly, there are latent selection dispositions in humans that react to innate reflexes or basic needs. For example, advertising research has shown that recipients of advertising posters focus their gaze more on people than on objects. Sexual stimuli also trigger reflex reactions, which directs attention to these stimuli.
- Secondly, surprising or potentially threatening stimuli in the sense of bottom-up processing trigger an orientation reaction, which controls attention. These can be norm violations, rule violations or even acoustic or visual level jumps such as loud screams or changes in light. As a result, the sensory receptor thresholds are lowered, which increases the perceptual sensitivity of our information processing system. There is also a four- to six-second slowing of the heart rate (Lang, 2000). However, particularly intense or threatening stimuli no longer trigger an orientation reaction, but rather a fright or defence reaction. Let's think of a horror film, for example, in which a calm, tranquil scene is abruptly interrupted by a terrifying scenario.
- Thirdly, the *priming* paradigm can explain why people pay involuntary attention to content-related stimuli. According to the priming paradigm, information that has recently been presented in a related form and is therefore still activated in short-term memory involuntarily receives increased attention. Priming is a process in which information (the so-called “prime”) activates certain knowledge units in an individual's memory. By activating these knowledge units, they are temporarily made more readily accessible, i.e. they are more easily remembered or come to mind. If the person is then confronted with further information, the knowledge units that have just been made accessible are more likely to be considered. This can have the consequence that the knowledge units made accessible are more likely to be used for the evaluation of new information. For example, it

has been shown that reading guidelines for evaluating news can increase critical thinking during news reception, making it easier to distinguish fake news from real news (Lutzke et al., 2019). In addition to this *cognitive* or *semantic priming*, there is also *affective priming*, in which emotions felt by recipients influence further information processing (cf. Janiszewski & Wyer, 2014; Minton et al., 2017). For example, Baumgartner and Wirth (2012) have shown that recipients who are confronted with positive messages are also more likely to process positive information in the subsequent message reception, even though the subsequent messages had nothing to do with the original message. The likelihood of positive information being perceived in the subsequent messages was increased by the original message. However, priming is not a reflexive, deterministic effect, but depends on certain conditions: In principle, the activation and use of the more easily accessible knowledge units is all the more likely a) the shorter the prime occurred in the past, b) the more frequently the prime occurs and c) the more applicable the activated knowledge unit is to the subsequent environmental information (cf. Peter, 2002).

The principle of resource allocation, which was proposed by Kahnemann (1973), applies to both automatic and controlled attention. This means that people only have a limited amount of cognitive energy with which they can process stimuli, store them in their working memory, make them consciously available and carry out reactions (see also Lang, 2000). Our capacity to process information is therefore limited. The more energy we devote to a task and the more we concentrate on it, the less we are able to direct our attention to other, alternative stimuli or tasks. For example, if we read a newspaper to follow the latest news, we will find it difficult to concentrate on our favourite music at the same time. However, people can also divide their attentional resources between different sources, especially if only one channel is semantically processed (cf. Lang, 2000; Wirth, 2001). A more recent model by Buijzen et al. (2010), the *Processing Model for Commercial Media Content (PCMC)* assumes that information processing takes place in two stages. First, recipients consciously or unconsciously decide which content to devote their limited attention resources to. This is followed by the decision as to *when* the resources are utilised in the information processing process. This results in three routes of information processing persuasive communication: systematic, heuristic and automatic processing. All three types of information processing can lead to changes in attitude and behaviour, but the mechanisms that bring about these changes differ depending on the route (e.g. active vs. passive learning; high or low concentration; Buijzen et al., 2010).

The limitation of resources explains a number of phenomena in reception research. For example, studies investigate whether humour in political messages (e.g. in political speeches or in a late-night show) increases or decreases the learning of political information. It is known from humour research that understanding humour ties up cognitive capacities. When other people tell a joke, it is often the case that you have to concentrate on the punch line in order to understand the joke. The study by Young (2008) shows that humour in political messages can lead to recipients directing more cognitive resources to understanding the humour and therefore being less able to examine and retain the arguments. This can lead to humour increasing the persuasiveness of messages, as it prevents a critical examination of the message. If the resources demanded by the medium exceed the available resources on the recipient's side, this can lead to so-called *information overload* (information overload). In social networks, where notifications, posts and messages continuously attract the attention of users, the latter have to process, store and retrieve a large amount of content almost simultaneously. Feelings of

information overload can favour stress, sleep problems and depressive symptoms and thus reduce the general well-being of media users (Koban et al., 2023; Matthes et al., 2020).

## 4. Information processing: Storage and retrieval

So far, we have explained what information is perceived during reception and what attention is focused on. Now we turn to the question of how the perceived information is stored and retrieved.

### 4.1 Memory as an associative network

We have already learnt about the basic functioning of our cognitive system above. In cognitive psychology, the human long-term memory is understood as an *associative network* (Higgins & Brendl, 1995). The memory contents are connected to each other by so-called associations (also known as associative pathways). When a certain memory content is recalled, we call it activated. This means that the information is transferred from the long-term memory to the working memory. However, this activation does not only relate to this one content, but can subsequently spread to related content. This is called the spreading of activation. The stronger the connection between two memory contents, the more likely it is that a related content will also be activated.

The activation of memory content depends on two conditions (cf. Higgins & Brendl, 1995; Peter, 2002; Wyer, 2003): Firstly, on the frequency with which a content was activated in the past and secondly, on the time interval with which the content was last recalled. The shorter the interval, the stronger the activation. The more frequently content is activated, the more permanently or chronically available it is. A longer period of non-activation can lead to content being less available (cf. Grant, 1993). Chronically available memory content then plays a primary role in the formation of judgements and attitudes (→ III.1 Judgement and evaluation processes in media use), as it has a decisive influence on social judgements.

In addition, a simplified distinction is made between *semantic* and *episodic memory* (cf. Anderson, 2001; Renkl, 2009). Information such as knowledge, concepts or definitions are stored in semantic memory, as for example, the knowledge on how a television programme is structured. Episodic memory, on the other hand, contains experiences that do not necessarily only relate to the individual. For example, recipients can recall the plots, characters and setting of a crime thriller, as well as what they themselves did during media usage. In addition to semantic and episodic memory, there is also metacognitive memory, which contains knowledge about knowledge (i.e. knowledge about how one's own thinking works; see Renkl, 2009, for more details).

In summary, this means that semantic or episodic knowledge units are stored in the memory and can automatically activate related knowledge units when they are activated. Some knowledge units are chronically available; the probability that they will be recalled is therefore generally higher. In cognitive research, there are a number of ideas about how memory content is organised and stored. Important concepts and approaches include schema theory, connectionism and mental models, which we will elaborate in the next three sections.

## 4.2 Schemata

A prominent assumption in cognitive research states that our knowledge is organised in the form of schemata (for this chapter, see Matthes, 2004). The term schema or schemata (plural) was introduced into psychological research by Bartlett (1932). Bartlett investigated the memory performance of test subjects when reproducing a Native American folk tale. He found that the test subjects omitted numerous details and instead modified the legend according to their own expectations. From these results, Bartlett concluded that generic knowledge structures, so-called schemata, were responsible for the errors in reproduction.

Put simply, according to schema theory, human knowledge is organised like a system of drawers: In principle, there are an infinite number of drawers, as there is a schema for every situation, every object, etc. In the course of information processing, either one drawer is opened – which in turn can lead to the opening of linked drawers – or all drawers remain closed, i.e. the information is not understood. In this case, new drawers can also be created. Schemata are therefore pre-structured, relatively stable knowledge packages that are activated or not activated. When it comes to action sequences, these are called *scripts* (e.g. a script for a typical evening of television). Schemata are relevant at two points in the information processing process (cf. Rumelhart, 1980; Taylor & Crocker, 1981): When information reaches the information processing system, the schema that best matches the incoming information is first identified. We have already familiarised ourselves with this phase of schema identification as bottom-up information processing. Which schema is identified determines whether and how this information is understood and categorised. Furthermore, once a schema has been identified, it controls the processing of the upcoming information and also the activation of linked schemata. This phase corresponds to top-down information processing and constitutes the actual core area of schema theory (cf. Schwarz, 1985, pp. 277–278). Furthermore, schemas have a pyramid structure and are connected to each other by a network of associations (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Rumelhart, 1980; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014). This has also already been described with the network character of human memory.

### Functions of schemata

Schemata have three closely interlinked functions (Fiske & Taylor, 1991): Firstly, they relieve the information processing system (*relief function*). By using a schema, not every stimulus has to be processed in depth. A second function is the structuring of experiences (*structuring function*) or the assignment of meaning to incoming information. This means that when recipients are confronted with a lot of information during a news programme, for example, the incoming information is structured against the background of the existing schemata (cf. Halkias & Kokkinaki, 2017). This structuring function is the basis for schema-induced memory performance, as schema-relevant information is remembered more easily and quickly than schema-irrelevant information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). However, schemata are not only responsible for memory gaps, but also for additions. People systematically add information that is not part of the original stimulus. In this context, Minsky (1975) introduces the concept of *default options*. If a schema-constituting element is not present in the stimulus when matching the schema and the stimulus, this does not necessarily lead to a misfit (i.e. non-fit). Instead, default values are used that occur in similar situations. For example, if a person

describes a doctor to another person, then asks the other person to reproduce the description, they might mention a white coat even though it was not part of the original description. Such additions allow information to be contextualised in a meaningful way. This is the third function of schemata, the *supplementary function*. In addition, schemata form the basis for problem solving and action. These three functions of schemata explain how recipients process or store knowledge about topics, people, objects or facts during media reception (cf. e.g. Conover & Feldman, 1984; Miller et al., 1986). If a schema is available, the information can be categorised and processed quickly and efficiently. This reasoning can be found, for example, in research on news usage: schemata enable individuals to place the news in a meaningful context and thus understand it quickly. This ensures effective handling of the wealth of information conveyed by the mass media. Schema theory can also show how a topic is represented by the recipient: as a cognitive schema. Similarly, it is possible to describe which schemata recipients have about election candidates (cf. Miller et al., 1986). Research on genres and genres argues similarly: Genre, channel or programme schemes determine which characteristics a format must have in order to be meaningfully classified by recipients (cf. Bilandzic, 1999; Fredin & Tabaczynski, 1993; Gehrau, 2003). Bilandzic (1999) describes selective television viewing as a schema-guided process: each switch is seen as the beginning of a new decision-making process in which a genre, genre, theme or channel schema is activated, which in turn leads to an evaluation of what is shown. If a schema is available for a stimulus, it is processed more quickly (Bilandzic, 1999, p. 97).

Furthermore, schemata determine which media information is perceived and remembered (cf. Coleman, 2003; Garramone et al., 1991). This can explain, for example, why people show systematic gaps when reconstructing news: Only the details that correspond to the initiated schema are reproduced. For example, in a qualitative study, Graber (1988) repeatedly interviewed 21 people about political media coverage and linked their statements to the media reports. The author was initially able to show that the panellists retained only a small part of the media coverage or that only a few facts could be reproduced. Graber attributes this result to schema-led information processing: the information from the media coverage is integrated into existing schemata and thus contextualised. Through schema-led information processing, the information loses its level of detail and is represented in a comparatively more abstract way.

Finally, schemata explain recipients' active meaning construction processes. If recipients are asked about the content of media coverage, they sometimes name or add content that was not even present in the media reports. This function was worked out most clearly in the dynamic-transactional approach (cf. Früh, 1996). In schematic information processing, connections are made between the media stimulus and existing schemata. For example, Früh (1996) was able to show that the cognitive processing of media information stimuli is more strongly influenced by subjective schemata than by the media topic structuring.

### Changes to schemata

Since schemata are relatively stable, the question arises as to how they develop and change. Rumelhart (1980) and Rumelhart and Norman (1978) propose three processes for this: Accretion, tuning and restructuring (see also Matthes, 2004). *Accretion* refers to the successive accumulation of factual knowledge, e.g. when learning telephone numbers or names. New information is added to an existing

schema without structural changes in the organisation of knowledge. If, however, no schema can be used for the new information, then learning through retention is no longer effective. In this case, either an existing schema must be modified (*tuning*) or a new schema must be created (*restructuring*). Tuning can take place in three different ways: Firstly, by successfully applying a schema to a situation multiple times, the schema can be adapted more closely to the overall population of affected situations. Secondly, a schema can be generalised to new situations or stimuli by adding a new aspect to the schema. Thirdly, in contrast to this type of tuning, the application of a schema can again be restricted to very specific situations. The last form of schema change, restructuring, refers to the creation of new schemata. The authors again propose two processes for this: *Patterned Recognition* and *Schema Induction*. Firstly, a new schema can emerge from an existing one through analogy learning (patterned recognition). In the process of schema induction, on the other hand, a new schema is formed when a previously unknown stimulus configuration occurs repeatedly.

### 4.3 Connectionist models

Schema theory is primarily about the activation or retrieval of a previously stored schema: A schema is either activated or not activated. If a schema is found, it is retrieved in the same form in which it was previously stored – similar to a file in a computer. For many cognitive researchers, this view is too static to adequately describe human information processing (cf. Anderson, 1977; Smith, 1996; for the following section Matthes, 2004). It is unlikely that an element of a cognitive network belongs to only one schema. According to this view, the cognitive network is characterised by a higher degree of plasticity and dynamism. The starting point of this so-called connectionist view is the attempt to gain insights into cognitive processes on the basis of computer simulations. Cognitive processes are modelled in such a way that they are as similar as possible to the underlying biological model. This involves neural modelling of cognitive processes (cf. Pospeschill, 2004, p. 17). Connectionist models are based on adaptive information-processing systems that are made up of a large number of processing units and transmit signals in the form of activation patterns via directed connections. This can be seen as a rough analogy to the biological nervous system, in which information processing is realised by a neural network. Put simply, information is represented as an activation pattern of individual units. These units are linked together in a network of connections. This corresponds to the concept of memory as an associative network, which we have outlined above. According to this view, knowledge is not stored in the form of local symbol carriers such as schemata, but is rather created as an activation pattern of individual neural elements. The representation of knowledge is distributive, active and can continue to change via activation patterns. A decisive difference to the schema theory is the massively parallel, i.e. simultaneous activity of many units. Furthermore, information processing does not proceed according to the all-or-nothing principle: the information processing system does not have to decide whether this or that schema should be used, but rather unique activation patterns can form and dissolve flexibly.

In a connectionist network, one could model something like a schema if a certain neuronal pattern is activated several times and therefore stabilised. From a connectionist perspective, a schema is no

longer saved, stored and retrieved. This paints a more flexible picture of information processing (Smith, 1996; Wirth, 1997).

#### 4.4 Mental models

Mental models are another prominent approach to the mental representation of information. These are discussed in detail in the chapter → III.4 Processes of comprehension in media use and are therefore excluded here.

#### 4.5 Memory, retrieval and forgetting

Remembering involves the retrieval of stored information from memory. This involves searching the associative network for specific information and reactivating it. By reactivation, we mean the transfer to working memory. What does this recall of media messages depend on? There are a number of findings on this, the most important of which are summarised below.

In general, studies have shown that processing content in greater detail and depth can lead to better information retention (Lang, 2000). This includes processes such as interpreting information, reflecting or elaborating on information, repeating information, generating knowledge units and metacognitively monitoring and controlling one's own knowledge acquisition (cf. Renkl, 2009). How thoroughly and carefully information is absorbed therefore plays a decisive role. In media reception, it is quite conceivable that information is processed and absorbed less carefully (Lang, 2000). For example, when consuming media, we do not always devote our full attention to the content (e.g. reading the newspaper at breakfast while the radio is playing). Or a message requires more resources than are available to us, e.g. a news report on tax policy.

The associative model of human memory described above also shows that the memory of a specific content is stronger the more associative connections there are to this content, i.e. the more strongly the content is linked to other content (see Lang, 2000). Furthermore, memory depends on the order of presentation. Cognitive research has shown that information that is mentioned first and last is remembered best. This is also known as the *primacy* or *recency effect* (cf. Neisser, 1974). In simple terms, this can be explained by the fact that information mentioned last is still retrievable in the working memory and can therefore be remembered easily. The information mentioned first, on the other hand, had the longest overall processing time and therefore the best chance of being stored in long-term memory (cf. Pieters & Bijmolt, 1997). Advertising research has shown, for example, that adverts at the beginning and end of a block actually have better chances of being remembered than adverts that are broadcast in the middle (cf. Pieters & Bijmolt, 1997; Zhao, 1997).

Emotions induced by media contributions can also promote retrieval. Studies show that emotions can intensify the processing and memorisation of a message (Bradley et al., 2007). This is particularly important in the context of emotional messages, advertisements or campaigns.

## Index

### A

Absorption 33, 86, 180, 276, 389, 391, 400, 505, 506, 510  
Access 32, 101, 105, 107, 112–114, 129, 133, 152, 177, 224, 225, 244, 251, 253, 318, 533, 551, 552, 556, 557, 576, 580, 582, 592, 594, 597, 598, 603, 605, 627, 635–637, 639, 640, 642, 644–646, 648–650, 676, 682, 684, 691–694, 696, 700, 709, 712, 717, 718  
Accessibility 226, 243–245, 627, 637–639, 641, 643–645, 650, 683  
Acting on media 572, 583  
Action  
– Action-based emotions 44  
– Action errors 64, 65  
– Parallel actions 65  
– Patterns of action 59, 66, 596  
– Persistence of action 65, 70  
Activation 22, 26–28, 30, 32, 213, 218, 219, 242, 243, 245, 279, 301, 314, 337, 340, 353, 355, 375, 379, 392, 444, 682  
– Active audience, active user 83, 139, 141, 146, 151  
– Cognitive 340  
– Motor 340  
Actor constellations 572, 576, 577  
Adaptation effect 500  
Addiction phenomenon 70  
Addressing 293, 319, 427, 434, 465, 471, 481, 571, 572, 581, 716  
Adopter types 124  
Adoption 121–125, 130–133, 151, 276, 427, 429, 448, 500, 506, 507, 675, 677–680, 684  
Aesthetics 40, 200, 371–374, 376, 379, 382–384, 540, 618  
– Aesthetic emotion 300, 371, 372, 376, 379–381, 383  
Affect-Management 177, 183  
Affect, affective  
– Affective dispositions 292, 293, 335, 336  
– Affective Disposition Theory 292, 293  
– Affective turn 245  
– Mixed affect 354  
– Modified Differential Affect Scale 297  
Affection 44, 144, 291–294, 297, 302, 435  
Affordances 71, 84, 472, 525, 540, 607, 681  
Age 33, 70, 104, 112, 123, 125, 129, 130, 294, 312, 343, 356, 382, 444, 449, 452, 466, 472, 500, 507, 531, 558, 559, 574, 583, 596, 600, 603, 606, 617–620, 622–624, 627–629, 635, 636, 640, 642, 644, 648–650, 656, 667, 692, 693, 712  
Agent perspective 275, 276  
Algorithms 171, 322, 607, 708, 709, 712, 714, 718  
– Algorithmic awareness 707, 708, 713  
Antagonistic 333, 658, 661, 667, 668  
Appraisal 41, 43, 44, 47, 49, 185, 186, 298–300, 302, 376, 658

Appreciation 299, 323, 352–356, 358, 360, 361, 379, 384, 519, 663, 714  
Appropriation 68, 71, 72, 105, 106, 108, 110, 112, 121, 126–134, 151, 540, 551, 553, 556, 561, 562, 572, 575, 579, 580, 582, 591, 625, 663, 677–680  
Articulation 126, 127, 502, 571, 577  
Attachment style 430  
Attention  
– arbitrary 378  
– involuntary 25  
Attribution 39, 41–45, 47, 60, 68, 179, 214–216, 223, 235, 236, 272, 276, 296, 468, 480, 553  
Audience activity 67, 411  
Augmented reality 70  
Availability effects 243, 244  
Awareness 62–65, 67, 72, 139, 140, 201, 214, 340, 378, 391, 393, 397, 399, 401, 419, 427, 448, 471, 501, 508, 707, 708, 713, 715, 716

### B

Balance Theory 163  
Behavioural tendency 193, 339, 340  
Big Brother 466, 562  
Big Five 193–195, 202, 204  
Binge watching 110, 447, 538, 698  
– Hyper binge 531  
– Intentional binging 533  
Biographic Resonance Theory 311, 312, 358  
Blindness 427, 599, 635, 639, 641, 643, 644, 648  
Book 62, 85, 186, 200, 271, 273, 276, 284, 338, 351, 353, 358, 375, 393, 396, 398, 434, 532, 581, 594–596, 603, 624, 625, 655–657, 664, 676  
Boomerang effect 296, 497, 500, 501, 509  
Bottom-up processing 25  
Bridging inferences 277

### C

Case studies 69, 104, 105, 113, 114, 126, 235, 561, 577  
Censorship 521, 593, 595, 597, 607  
Challenge 48, 70–72, 86, 87, 89, 90, 109, 144, 183, 184, 187, 200, 334, 358, 380, 390–392, 400, 432, 433, 437, 481, 508, 510, 538, 539, 551, 552, 564, 582, 607, 644, 675, 681, 684, 691, 715  
Children 25, 113, 114, 125, 185, 273, 274, 281, 294, 297, 312–316, 320, 343, 414, 448, 449, 468, 472, 488, 509, 555, 563, 576–578, 596, 598, 604, 618, 620, 621, 623–628, 636, 637, 655, 657, 659, 661–664, 683  
Chronic diseases 635  
Cinema 23, 198, 313, 314, 316, 331, 338, 342, 560, 594, 596, 602, 603, 617, 618, 621, 622, 627–629, 655, 665, 665, 693  
Circumplex Model 46  
Classification 67, 128, 142, 215, 322, 338, 377–379, 428, 454, 469, 620, 707, 710, 711

## Index

---

- Cliques 571, 572, 575, 577, 659  
Co-Usage 655–658, 660, 661, 663, 666–669  
Co-Viewing 540, 655, 656, 662, 663, 669, 699, 700  
Cognition, cognitive  
– Cognitive-attributional theories 39, 45, 47  
– Cognitive dissonance 160, 164, 165, 169, 172, 254–257, 261, 262, 414, 498, 500, 504, 522, 523  
– Cognitive foundations 21, 33, 376  
– Cognitive load 82, 278, 282, 284  
– Cognitive Load Theory 282  
– Cognitive processes 21, 22, 29, 30, 33, 45, 46, 62, 63, 139, 141, 185, 237, 242, 257, 272, 282, 284, 297–299, 302, 337, 354, 371, 372, 374, 376–381, 395, 399, 412, 427, 444, 446, 510, 518–521, 524, 650, 658, 663, 666, 682, 684, 696–698  
– Cognitive Psychology 27, 33, 63, 82, 375  
– Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning 282  
– Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 159, 163–165, 167, 168  
– Theory of Cognitive Information Processing 61  
Cohort 107, 618, 622, 624, 659  
Collectivity 571, 582  
Comfort TV 534  
Commitments 354, 412, 413, 430, 517, 520, 521, 524  
Communication  
– Communication channels 123, 429, 480, 506  
– Communication mode 106  
– Communication practices 107, 108, 596  
– Communicative action 61, 69, 70  
– Communicator credibility 221  
– Communitisation 69, 101, 102, 109, 112, 113, 317, 551, 555, 563, 571–583, 599, 621, 659  
– Oral communication 597  
– Persuasive communication 26, 224, 302, 318, 436, 480, 498  
Community 44, 91, 106, 111, 129, 130, 142, 195, 311, 312, 342, 510, 571–583, 591, 604, 643, 666, 699, 708  
– Community building 571–575, 578, 579, 582, 583  
– Local communities 142, 571, 572, 574, 575, 577, 580  
– Online communities 575, 578, 579, 581, 622  
– Pioneer communities 582, 583  
– Religious communities 571, 572, 579, 580  
– Technology-related communities 571, 572, 581–583  
– Territorial communities 575, 579  
– Translocal communities 564, 571–573, 575, 578–582  
– Virtual communities 195  
Comparative cultural research 552  
Comparison 24, 33, 71, 88, 142–144, 164, 169, 182, 201, 213, 225, 276, 298, 299, 335, 336, 339, 356, 359, 375, 393, 429, 430, 434, 443, 451–455, 469, 512, 536, 551, 554–558, 563, 564, 599, 669  
– Horizontal comparison 451  
– Lateral comparison 451  
– Social comparison 33, 71, 88, 143, 182, 201, 276, 298, 299, 335, 336, 339, 393, 430, 443, 451–455, 469, 536  
– Theory of Social Comparison Processes 182  
– Upward comparison 451–454  
Compatibility 45, 123, 125, 130, 131, 391  
Compensation 195, 196, 198, 199, 204, 434, 647  
Complementary 178, 195, 204, 697  
Complexity 33, 39, 59, 72, 123, 125, 130, 133, 161, 242, 246, 282, 297, 299, 300, 302, 344, 375, 377, 390, 468, 482, 497, 498, 511, 607, 620, 645, 666, 677, 678, 709  
Composition 262, 337, 338, 520, 521, 524, 625, 648, 658, 667  
Computer games 24, 144, 204, 338, 390–392, 401, 443, 446, 447, 451, 466, 469, 471, 472, 617, 664  
Computer gaming 66, 621  
Conative 213, 215, 226, 410, 411, 428, 430–432, 451, 510, 657  
Conflicting goals 535, 537, 697, 698  
Congruent 32, 162, 177, 184, 185, 192, 195, 199, 203, 204, 223–225, 253, 339, 444, 647  
Connectionist models 30  
Conscientiousness 194, 201, 202  
Consistency theories 163  
Consonance 164, 165  
Constellation 69, 104, 114, 127, 193, 333–335, 340, 572, 576, 577, 624, 625, 660, 661, 664, 665  
Construction 29, 44, 61, 67, 69, 82, 219, 271, 272, 277, 280, 317, 380, 381, 394, 399, 400, 432, 465, 467, 470, 552, 571, 579, 580, 600, 618, 619  
Constructionist Theory 275  
Contact Hypothesis 436, 661  
Context  
– Context collapse 519, 521  
– Contextual factors 128, 235, 252, 322, 377, 525, 562, 591, 592, 635, 637, 638, 640, 642, 643, 647, 650, 680, 711  
Continuity editing 280  
Controllability 47, 225, 298, 533, 536, 658  
Convergence 135, 560, 596  
Core Relational Themes 44, 48  
Counterarguing 254, 259, 394  
Credibility 84, 215, 216, 221, 242, 253, 284, 359, 436, 465, 467, 472, 479–482, 487, 488, 507, 519, 520  
Cringe-watching 534  
Cultivation  
– Cultivation approaches 197  
– Cultivation effects 197, 204, 299  
– Cultivation Theory 294  
Cultural studies 67, 69, 109, 110, 112, 114, 315, 371, 384, 562  
Culture  
– Cultural capital 69, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111  
– Cultural determinism 69  
– Cultural factors 240, 556, 561  
– Cultural practice 107, 593, 597  
Curiosity 271–274, 280, 333, 339, 340, 375, 532, 536, 716  
Cyberbullying 71, 447
- D**  
Data traces 168, 606  
Deictic Shift Theory 276

- Deliberate, targeted 24, 44, 48, 60, 66, 68, 102, 106,  
108, 178, 179, 201, 378, 412, 452, 504, 510, 604, 662,  
695, 714, 715
- Demographic factors 486, 592
- Deterritorialisation 580
- Deterritorial communities 575, 579–581
- Developmental Psychology 113
- Diary studies 72, 103, 320
- Diaspora 580
- Differential Psychology 66
- Differential Susceptibility to Media Effects Model 90,  
534
- Diffusion 121–125, 127, 130–135, 556, 676, 677, 679,  
685, 691
- Diffusion dynamics 123, 124
  - Diffusion process 122–125, 130, 131, 556, 677
- Digitisation 572
- Digital disability divide 637, 638, 642
  - Digital immigrants 70
  - Digital natives 70
  - Digital parenting 577
- Disability 302, 635–643, 645–650
- People with disabilities 635–638, 641–643, 646,  
647, 649, 650
- Discourse 40, 107, 108, 167, 234, 238, 246, 251, 261,  
262, 291, 311, 313, 339, 393, 531, 532, 662, 700, 709,  
716, 717
- Dispositions 25, 48, 66, 160, 178, 193–195, 197,  
202–204, 241, 292, 293, 320, 335, 336, 340, 343, 360,  
411, 472, 695
- Distancing 336
- Docu-soaps 465–467
- Domestication 105, 112, 121, 125–134, 556, 625, 678,  
679
- Re-domestication 127, 131
- Double articulation 126, 127
- Downward comparison 453
- Dual-Process Model 213, 220, 223, 224, 226
- E**
- Echo chamber 159, 168, 171, 251, 252, 260–263, 284,  
716–718
- Economic factors 69, 124, 133, 595, 619, 626, 639
- Education 66, 69, 104, 107, 113, 125, 129, 133, 397, 436,  
480, 486, 504, 555, 556, 558, 559, 576, 577, 592,  
594, 598, 599, 606, 618, 621, 635, 637, 639, 640,  
646–650, 657
- Formal education 69, 635, 647, 649
- Elaboration 83, 260, 276, 291, 299, 303, 354, 411, 415,  
504–506, 510, 517, 520–522, 524, 525
- Cognitive elaboration 260, 276, 291, 299, 303, 354,  
505
  - Elaborative inferences 278
- Embodied Cognition 277
- Emotion
- Artifact emotion 381
  - Basic emotions 41, 42, 47, 297
  - Discrete emotion 46, 47, 291, 292, 296, 297, 302,  
512
  - Emotional contagion 46, 427, 668
  - Emotional experience 39, 41, 42, 44, 48, 49, 152,  
277, 291–293, 297–300, 302, 303, 339, 352, 360,  
592, 658, 660, 661, 668
  - Emotional flow 291, 295, 297, 302
  - Emotional intelligence 48
  - Emotional schemata 44
  - Emotion regulation 39, 41, 45, 49, 177, 647
  - Event-based emotion 44
  - Fiction emotion 381
  - Meta-emotion 39, 45, 47, 49, 177, 181–183, 185, 201,  
223, 245, 291, 295, 299–302, 336, 339, 351–354,  
381, 394, 417, 536, 658
  - Mixed emotions 39, 47, 291, 300–302, 311, 314, 381
  - Object-based emotion 44
  - Primary emotion 47, 300
- Emotion Theory 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 381
- Psychoevolutionary Emotion Theory 41
  - Social-Constructive Theories of Emotion 44, 45
- Empathy 41, 46, 110, 197, 201, 203, 204, 295–297, 301,  
302, 336, 339, 343, 356, 357, 400, 435, 443–450,  
454, 455, 505, 647, 661
- Empathic distress 339
  - Empathic reactions 362, 444–447
  - Media empathy 443, 445, 446, 454
- Empowerment 675, 684
- Entertainment
- Entertainment experience 184, 295, 301, 302, 319,  
351–355, 417, 419, 434, 435, 504, 537, 663, 691,  
695, 696, 698, 700
  - Entertainment function 595
  - Entertainment needs 535, 603, 605
- Episodic 27, 40, 235, 237, 245, 312, 313, 534
- Episodic memory 27, 312, 313
- Escapism 196, 197, 204, 320, 342, 535, 536, 594, 626
- Ethnomethodology 67
- Eudaimonia, Eudaimonic 111, 177, 182, 184, 186, 187,  
291, 299–302, 319, 320, 351, 353–357, 417, 419
- Eudaimonic approach 177, 184
  - Eudaimonic entertainment 301, 319, 351, 353–357,  
417, 419
- Europe 72, 236, 317, 557–560, 563, 565, 571, 579, 593,  
600, 608, 676
- Evaluation criteria 44
- Event 44, 152, 185, 198, 215, 223, 235, 239, 240, 272,  
276–278, 312, 315, 320, 321, 333, 339, 341, 468, 469,  
484, 500, 532, 533, 538, 600, 601, 628, 665
- Event Indexing Model 278
  - Live events 578, 601
  - Media event 468, 578–580, 665, 666
- Event reflection task 318, 321, 323
- Everyday life 40, 65–70, 72, 89, 101–110, 112–114, 124,  
127, 129, 131, 159, 180, 181, 214, 216, 234, 276, 291,  
292, 298, 299, 318, 342, 382, 432, 497, 531, 540, 562,  
571, 577, 593, 607, 618, 619, 621, 623, 627, 629, 630,  
641, 659, 675, 678, 679, 692–694
- Coping with everyday life 69, 113, 641

## Index

---

- Escape from everyday life 65
- Evolution
  - Evolutionary-functional perspective 41
  - Evolutionary Psychology 333, 382
- Excitation 42, 202, 298, 339
  - Excitation transfer 42, 298, 339
- Expectancy-value model 67, 140, 147–149, 153
- Expectation of self-efficacy 196, 204
- Experience of competence 65
- Experience of tension 435
- Experimental 151, 165, 166, 171, 181, 225, 226, 235–237, 243, 253, 255, 260, 281, 314, 317, 334, 372, 373, 375, 415, 433, 480, 483, 487, 488, 509, 538, 582, 591, 592, 599, 696
- Extraversion 194, 197–200, 202–204, 400
- Eye-tracking studies 255, 380, 592
  
- F**
- Face-to-face communication 425, 426, 578
- Facebook 144, 147, 169, 171, 196, 200, 322, 429, 555, 693, 710, 712–714
- Facial Action Coding System (FACS) 42
- Factor-analytical approach 480
- False information 258, 299, 468
- Family 69, 104, 106, 110–114, 126, 128, 129, 161, 312, 315, 355, 519, 521, 562, 576, 577, 594, 595, 598, 618, 619, 626–629, 637, 645, 657, 659, 664, 665, 675, 682, 707
- Fan cultures 580
- Fear 41–44, 47, 112, 182, 200–202, 258, 291–302, 314, 331–333, 336, 340–342, 344, 360, 447, 487, 501, 621, 660, 662, 695, 699
  - Fear appeals 293, 295, 297
- Fear of missing out (FOMO) 578
- Feedback 67, 71, 86, 241, 378, 391, 398, 399, 508, 517–525
- Feeling 41, 47, 88, 108, 109, 149, 183, 196, 197, 215, 225, 256, 284, 293, 301, 302, 312, 321, 340, 352–355, 360–362, 371, 380, 397, 399, 400, 409, 417, 454, 482, 502, 523, 524, 532, 536, 571, 572, 602, 624, 642, 665, 683
- Feelings of guilt 182, 292, 296, 297, 531, 535–537, 698, 700
- Fiction 295, 333, 338, 381, 391, 465–467, 469, 470, 472, 581
- Field Theory 61
- Figuration 106, 572, 575, 576, 581, 582
- Filtering
  - Filter bubbles 242, 251, 252, 260–262, 284, 716, 717
- First-order media 243, 556
- Flow 43, 48, 65, 70, 86, 87, 89, 291, 295, 297, 302, 389–394, 397, 400, 401, 451, 532, 534, 537, 655, 664, 665, 711, 718
- Flow experience 65, 70, 87, 391, 394
- Fragmentation 70, 107, 113, 129, 159, 168, 252, 262, 576, 694, 716
- Frame
  - Audience frames 233, 236, 238, 239, 242
  - Documents Model Framework 284

- Egocentric reference frame 398
- Equivalence frame 235
- Frame of reference 72, 377, 539
- Media frames 233, 234, 236, 238–240, 242, 245
- Framing 104, 106, 216, 218, 233–246, 280, 298, 301, 466, 485, 504, 532
  - Emotional framing 298
  - Episodic framing 235, 237, 245
- Friend 40, 143, 198, 254, 279, 317, 355, 358, 362, 398, 418, 425, 428, 430, 467, 498, 510, 519, 521, 571, 572, 574, 575, 577, 578, 597, 599, 621, 624, 627, 657, 659, 665, 682, 707, 710
  - Friendship 40, 358, 425, 430, 574, 578

## G

- Game 24, 32, 66, 69, 70, 79–82, 84–86, 88, 181, 199, 202, 203, 235, 240, 271, 314, 317, 319, 320, 331, 336, 344, 391, 392, 401, 443, 446, 447, 451, 469, 485, 581, 655, 664–666
  - Game Theory 69
- Gender III, II2, 125, 126, 128–130, 133, 311, 343, 356, 394, 444, 472, 485, 554, 558, 562, 606, 618, 622, 623, 629, 635, 656, 661, 667, 683, 684
- General Aggression Model 204
- Generation
  - Generation Alpha 70
  - Generation X 70
  - Generation Y 70
  - Generation Z 70
- Genres 29, 111, 142, 169, 170, 193, 194, 197, 200–202, 273, 275, 281, 294, 299, 301, 313, 331, 332, 335, 338, 343, 394–396, 401, 409, 428, 434, 466, 467, 470–472, 480, 482, 484, 488, 551, 562, 575, 576, 606, 629, 647, 694, 711
- Geopolitical regions 572, 578–580
- Gestalt 373, 378
- Goal 33, 46, 59–67, 81, 114, 130, 140, 184, 223, 224, 256–260, 278, 298, 334, 352, 362, 398, 557, 697, 698, 708, 711
- Group 41, 43, 44, 104–106, 113, 123, 161, 164, 166, 215, 221, 225, 237, 242, 273, 274, 293, 301, 314, 315, 317, 318, 321, 356, 358, 413, 449, 468, 469, 511, 538, 562, 574, 577, 578, 591, 594, 598, 606, 620–624, 635, 636, 642–646, 648, 649, 655, 658–663, 665–667, 677, 712, 716
- Group rivalry 293

## H

- Habit 34, 62–65, 69, 71, 72, 101–104, 108, 109, 127, 145, 150, 151, 167, 382, 383, 508, 537, 552, 592, 595, 597, 600, 603, 605–607, 623, 624, 626, 629, 647, 678, 679, 691, 692, 694, 695, 697, 699–701, 710
- Habitualisation 607, 695, 697
- Habitus 69, 108
- Hate speech 71, 171, 235, 363, 621
- Hedonic 187, 292, 295, 301, 319, 320, 332, 351, 353–355, 375, 379, 531, 535

- Heuristics 21, 26, 34, 62, 84, 105, 106, 122, 167, 221, 222, 224, 226, 245, 256, 259, 260, 262, 354, 411, 573, 658
- Heuristic-Systematic Model 220
- Hierarchical-sequential regulation 62
- High-cost situation 63
- History 39, 89, 113, 164, 280, 317, 371, 372, 375, 580, 591, 592, 596, 597, 607, 608, 618, 675
- Hope 44, 46, 142, 149, 215, 217, 220, 291–295, 297, 298, 302, 331, 332, 336, 341, 344, 351, 352, 356, 358, 360, 537, 659
- Hostile media effect 296, 302, 414, 448
- Household 104, 106, 112, 126–129, 134, 557, 576, 592, 594, 595, 601–603, 607, 636, 642, 656, 657, 659, 665, 678, 679
- I**
- Identification 28, 66, 71, 87–89, 143, 182, 200, 201, 275, 276, 294, 298, 299, 301, 321, 335, 336, 339, 355, 393, 395, 412, 417, 429, 430, 443, 448–451, 453–455, 466, 469, 470, 486, 505, 506, 536, 537, 552, 578, 621, 663, 669
- Identity 47, 61, 88, 101, 109, 111, 113, 114, 129, 143, 273, 314, 317, 322, 356, 414, 417–419, 429, 448–451, 469, 470, 501, 522, 551, 558, 562, 563, 577, 581, 618, 619, 621, 622, 624, 625, 629, 640, 661, 662, 679
- Identity Shift 522
  - Identity work 451, 624
  - Social identity 101, 111, 314, 317, 356
- Ideological processing 251
- Imaginations 130, 400, 525, 578, 607
- Imagined audience 214, 517–521, 523, 524
- Immersion 65, 71, 79, 86, 110, 145, 271, 276, 389, 390, 394, 395, 400, 401, 468, 531, 532, 537, 660, 663, 684
- Immersed Experienter Framework 276
  - Immersive experience 87, 89, 186, 389, 400, 401, 449, 467
- Impairments 635, 636, 638–650
- Cognitive impairment 639, 645, 646, 648, 650
  - Hearing impairment 646
  - Physical and motor impairment 639, 645, 646, 648, 650
  - Psychological impairment 635, 649
  - Visual impairment 636, 641, 643, 644, 648, 649
- Impression management 661
- Incongruent 184, 185, 195, 225, 501
- Indexing hypothesis 240
- Individualisation 70, 91, 605
- Networked individualism 574
- Influencer 69, 294, 351, 428, 433, 436, 437, 450, 507, 508, 511, 622
- Information
- Information overload 26, 27, 113
  - Information processing 21–26, 28–31, 33, 61, 62, 79, 82–84, 90, 213, 220, 221, 224, 251–253, 256, 258–260, 299, 354, 375, 381, 411, 454, 504, 510, 691, 696, 697, 700
  - Information repertoires 106, 637, 646–650
- Innovation decision-making process 123, 677
- Inspiration/Inspiring 143, 351–353, 356–360, 362–364, 451, 454
- Intention 60, 63, 64, 70, 86, 141, 151, 167, 255, 282, 320, 362, 372, 436, 467, 480, 500, 505, 506, 508, 509, 539, 678
- Intentionality 67, 139, 140, 394, 531, 533–535, 537–539
- Interaction 68, 71, 80, 83, 84, 86–91, 102, 104, 112, 144, 160, 198, 204, 205, 224, 226, 239, 257, 261, 263, 283, 302, 322, 379, 383, 389, 400, 411, 425–430, 433, 434, 443, 448, 498, 505, 506, 508, 517, 518, 520, 524, 535, 552, 581, 625, 638, 649, 659, 660, 664–666, 683, 691, 699, 707, 714, 717
- Interactivity 70, 79–91, 425, 428, 434, 437, 517, 518, 709
  - Parasocial interaction 34, 412, 413, 425, 427, 430–434, 437, 446, 448, 505, 506, 553, 660
  - Symbolic interactionism 67, 68, 426, 572
- International Classification of Functioning 638
- Internet 62, 122, 129, 130, 132–134, 144, 150, 168, 169, 196, 198, 199, 205, 251, 260, 281, 283, 284, 363, 467, 471, 472, 535, 552, 556, 557, 559, 560, 576, 592, 596, 606, 607, 622, 623, 625, 640, 642, 643, 646, 648–650, 656, 657, 659, 669, 691–693, 695, 696, 700, 712
- Interpersonal communication 125, 130, 242, 524, 592, 682
- Interpretation 42, 47, 48, 59, 60, 67, 68, 71, 72, 109–111, 164, 197, 233, 235, 236, 244, 271, 272, 279, 281, 337, 378, 410, 448, 551, 555, 562, 575, 576, 639, 642, 643, 647, 649, 650, 659–663, 699
- Intimacy 660
- Intra-audience effect 661
- Involvement
- Ego-involvement 263, 409, 410, 412, 414–419
  - Involved experience 416–419
  - Retrospective imaginative involvement 393, 395, 429
- J**
- Journalism
- Journalistic quality 481, 483, 484, 487, 488
- Judgement
- Formation of judgement 27, 79, 214, 216, 219–223
- L**
- Lay epistemology 258, 259
- Leisure time 103, 104, 127, 178, 577, 578, 592, 595, 598–600, 602, 603, 607, 623, 659, 675, 683
- Lifestyle 66, 69, 104–107, 114, 237, 316, 618, 629, 692
- Limited Capacity Model of Motivated Mediated Message Processing 33, 82
- Living environment 69, 195, 618, 639
- Locus of control 196, 204
- Long-term research 574, 577
- Low cost situation 63

## Index

---

### M

Majority 181, 262, 335, 341, 357, 434, 435, 523, 534, 557, 560, 602, 605, 606, 623, 642, 648, 662, 663, 680, 693, 699

Meaningfulness 59, 72, 351, 355, 358

#### Media

- Media-induced nostalgia 311, 312, 315–323
  - Media awareness 399
  - Media change 90, 582, 617
  - Media character 71, 88, 143, 195, 294, 300, 333, 337, 344, 425, 426, 428, 429, 431–435, 437, 443, 445, 447–452, 455, 470, 504–506, 661, 697
  - Media competence 595
  - Media contact 552
  - Media credibility 479–482
  - Media criticism 485
  - Media culture 580
  - Media cynicism 482, 487
  - Media ensemble 572, 576–578
  - Media environment 21, 66, 67, 70, 79, 82, 87, 88, 145, 224, 252, 260, 263, 323, 363, 373, 400, 429, 454, 504, 511, 517, 518, 522, 562, 565, 572, 583, 606, 625, 635, 643, 649, 681, 692–695, 699–701, 708–717
  - Media generation 582, 617, 618, 650
  - Media habit 102, 603, 691, 694, 701
  - Media innovation 130, 131
  - Media marathoning 531–533
  - Media multitasking 32, 691, 693, 694, 697, 698, 700
  - Media performance 481–483, 485
  - Media persons 213, 293, 294, 427, 435, 436, 443, 446, 449, 451, 452, 553
  - Media repertoire 105–108, 127–129, 560, 574, 575, 578, 580, 582, 617, 625, 626, 629, 630, 647, 684
  - Media scepticism 482, 603
  - Media trust 479, 481–489
- Media-Induced Nostalgic Contributions to Well-Being (MINCoW) Model 311, 318–320
- Mediation 243, 384, 397, 427, 627, 661, 662
- Mediatization 70, 130, 240, 571–575, 578, 581–583, 607
- Deep mediatization 572–575, 581–583
- Media use
- Habitual media use 145
  - Interactive media use 70, 79, 80, 82, 85, 89, 90, 517
  - Non-specific media use 65
- Medium Theory 573
- Memory 21–23, 25–28, 30–33, 71, 83, 110, 180, 219, 222, 224, 242–245, 256, 257, 273–275, 277–279, 281–283, 311–314, 317, 318, 323, 353, 375, 377, 378, 391, 427, 577, 628, 696, 699
- Memory trace 32, 180
- Mental models 27, 63, 88, 275, 283, 284, 394, 400, 446, 448, 467, 470
- Message credibility 480
- Metamedia 675, 681, 685
- Methods of thinking aloud 72
- Milieu 69, 101, 107, 108, 114, 598, 659
- Mind-body problem 39
- Minority 296, 661

Mirror neurons 336, 444

Misattributions 42

Mobile media 181, 596, 605, 625, 627, 639, 641, 650, 675–677, 680–682, 684, 685, 691, 692, 694, 697

Mobile Phone Appropriation Model 121, 679, 680

Mockumentaries 466, 467

Modalities 66, 71, 83, 101, 102, 283, 381, 383, 472, 532, 539, 540

Modality-Agency-Interactivity-Navigability (MAIN) Model 84

Modality principle 283

Model of Inspiring Media 356, 359, 362

Model of Narrative Comprehension and Engagement 393–395

#### Mood

- Mood Adjustment Approach 177, 178, 183

- Mood Congruency Hypothesis 177

- Mood Management 49, 177, 182, 185–187, 292, 295, 299, 342, 375

Morality 281, 333, 541

Moral judgements 281, 335, 339, 341

Moral Philosophy 39

Motivated processing 168, 224, 251

Motivated reasoning 251, 256–259, 262, 263

#### Motivation

- Extrinsic motivation 695, 700

- Intrinsic motivation 79, 84–87, 295, 354

- Motivational psychology 62

Multi Screening 69

Music 21, 26, 50, 86, 143, 170, 180, 182, 185, 198, 202, 203, 292, 301, 313, 316, 320, 322, 338, 344, 352, 359, 371, 373, 376, 379, 382, 390, 391, 416, 597, 599, 606, 618, 622, 626, 643, 644, 647, 664, 707, 712

### N

Naive media theories 713, 714

Narration 338, 341, 435, 592

- Narrative closure 532, 534

- Narrative completion 534, 536

- Narrative engageability 397

- Narrative engagement 320, 389, 393–397, 399–401, 472, 534, 537

- Narrative experience 344, 394, 395, 446

- Narrative realism 469, 470

Nation 321, 571, 572, 575, 578–580, 594

Need 33, 82, 86, 106, 110, 113, 123, 140–144, 149,

152, 162, 167, 177, 178, 183, 186, 187, 194, 195, 199,

202–204, 222, 223, 241, 245, 258, 259, 261, 272, 273,

295, 301, 302, 320, 321, 340, 360, 383, 392, 410, 416,

425, 428, 434, 451, 453, 469, 472, 484, 524, 536, 537,

560, 572, 578, 583, 596, 623, 628, 645, 657

Need for affect 194, 295, 301

Need for closure 204, 259

Need for cognition 194, 204, 222, 472, 484

Network Theory of Affect 185

Neuroticism 194, 196–199, 202–204, 400

Newspaper 26, 31, 80, 81, 108, 129, 143, 160, 166, 167, 169, 170, 219, 222, 242, 281, 291, 317, 466, 480–482,

- 486, 488, 499, 501, 511, 557, 558, 562, 571, 592–595,  
598, 599, 606, 617, 623–625, 639, 643, 648, 656,  
657, 664, 669, 707
- News reception 21, 26, 339
- Nostalgie 311–323, 352, 354, 360, 363, 380, 534
- Nudging 503, 510
- O**
- Offline 168, 199, 226, 253, 277, 278, 581, 623, 643, 649,  
691
- Online vigilance 511, 695, 697
- Openness to experience 194, 198, 200
- Operant learning 180
- Opinion formation 259, 707, 717
- Opportunity 60, 64, 70, 89, 110, 111, 123, 145, 181, 412,  
432, 448, 471, 498, 518, 536, 623
- Optimal experience 390
- Orientation 25, 33, 66, 101, 102, 107, 113, 130, 134, 139,  
142, 144, 164, 169, 194, 274, 280, 352, 362, 373, 501,  
519, 555, 561, 562, 572, 575, 582, 592, 598, 602,  
605–607, 621, 624, 636, 641, 663, 676
- Orientation reactions 25, 33, 274
- OTIUM check 64
- P**
- Paradox of tragedy 299, 301
- Parasocial phenomena 425, 426, 428–437
- Parents 104, 112, 113, 128, 313–316, 509, 576–578, 595,  
621, 627–629, 661, 662, 664, 683, 684
- Participation 82, 83, 105–108, 129, 133, 134, 150, 251,  
479, 518–520, 522, 557, 572, 606, 635–639, 641, 642,  
647, 648, 650, 666, 668, 675, 681, 682, 691
- Culture of participation 572
- Participatory 70, 467, 470, 472, 598, 606
- Partner 68, 104, 126, 134, 338, 382, 409, 427, 428, 522,  
576, 578, 623, 626, 656, 657, 660, 665
- Peer group 44, 571, 572, 575, 577, 578, 621
- Perceived reality 465, 468, 470
- Perception-Action Model of Empathy 444
- Perception mode 109
- Performance 28, 32, 65, 83, 105, 108, 198, 354, 360,  
390, 391, 416, 481–483, 485, 508, 639, 660, 664,  
696, 697
- Permanently connected 691, 700, 701
- Permanently online 691
- Persistence 64, 65, 70, 128, 413, 415, 427, 504, 525
- Personae 293, 294, 425–434, 436
- Personalisation 83, 239, 507, 676, 707, 709, 710,  
712–714, 716, 717
- Personality 48, 66, 83, 124, 125, 145, 146, 161, 182, 184,  
186, 193–205, 241, 259, 279, 301, 322, 341, 343, 357,  
397, 400, 411–413, 472, 507, 534, 535, 540, 677, 717
- Personality trait 48, 66, 83, 161, 182, 193, 259, 279,  
301, 322, 357, 397, 400, 411–413, 472, 534, 535,  
540, 677, 717
- Personal relevance 220, 259, 315, 409, 411, 412,  
415–419, 469, 710
- Person perception 449, 454
- Dyadic 449
- Monadic 449
- Persuasion 123, 130, 221, 244, 292, 296, 303, 397, 411,  
414, 415, 419, 436, 437, 469, 471, 473, 479, 480, 487,  
497, 498, 500, 503–508, 510, 517, 520, 522, 524
- Persuasive messages 293, 296, 413–415, 436, 437,  
447, 500, 502–509
- Phase
- Communicative phase 67, 81, 357, 552, 553
- Life phases 129, 617–620, 622, 624
- Post-communicative phase 67, 553
- Pre-communicative phase 67, 81, 357, 552
- Physical arousal 298, 342, 344
- Physiological measurements 71, 380
- Place illusion 399
- Planning and regularity 61
- Platforms 79, 81, 83, 85, 86, 101, 103, 106, 107, 168–171,  
213, 214, 219, 251, 429, 484, 485, 497, 506, 517–519,  
531–533, 536, 557, 559, 571, 572, 574, 581–583, 600,  
606, 607, 620, 622, 625, 627, 669, 682, 693, 707–718
- Platform collectivity 571, 572, 581–583
- Plausibility 334, 399, 468, 471
- Plausibility illusion 399
- Polarisation 168, 171, 238, 241, 252, 257, 258, 262, 263,  
296, 668, 716
- Political
- Political attitudes 160, 164, 166, 168, 169, 171, 257,  
471, 483, 486–488, 500, 509
- Political communication research 34, 233, 235
- Political media content 252, 257
- Political participation 108, 150, 675, 681, 682
- Political performance 483
- Political trust 483, 486, 487
- Polymediality 571, 572, 577, 581–583
- Populism 296, 321, 322, 718
- Post-traditional 573
- Practices 69, 106–109, 128, 484, 540, 552, 553, 556,  
557, 560, 562–564, 571–576, 578–583, 591–594, 596,  
599, 603, 605–607, 617, 625, 628, 647, 714
- Practice turn 572
- Preference 111, 164–169, 171, 172, 181, 195, 197–199, 202,  
203, 258, 295, 334–336, 339, 340, 343, 357, 376, 412,  
486, 522, 558, 606, 642, 645, 649, 660, 709
- Presence 84, 86–89, 110, 184, 213, 260, 316, 360, 389,  
393, 395, 397–401, 427, 433, 435, 537, 574, 655–658,  
660–667, 669, 682, 683, 699
- Co-presence 574, 699
- Social 87, 88, 397
- Spatial 87–89, 398, 400, 401
- Priming 25, 26, 34, 218, 223, 224, 226, 233, 244, 246,  
279
- Affective 26, 223, 224
- Prioritisation 707, 710, 711, 717
- Privacy 71, 498, 519
- Probability 27, 62, 148, 152, 165, 171, 180, 214–216, 333,  
334, 339, 341, 344, 378, 436, 468
- Processing Model for Commercial Media Content  
(PCMC) 26

## Index

---

### Process Model of the Formation of Spatial Presence

- Experiences 88
- Procrastination 535, 536, 697, 698
- Propaganda 321, 471, 480, 597, 600, 601, 604, 605
- Prosocial behaviour 71, 356, 504, 507
- Pseudo-documentaries 466, 467
- Psychoticism 194, 196, 197, 203
- Public commitment 517, 520, 521
- Public viewing 69, 574, 579, 655, 665, 666, 668
- Purposeful action 293

## Q

- Quality TV 531–533, 540
- Quasi-action 60

## R

- Racist 171, 604
- Radio 31, 62, 65, 90, 103, 107, 110, 125, 129, 143, 170, 271, 275, 283, 284, 317, 391, 481, 485, 518, 556–558, 579, 592, 595–604, 606, 620, 622, 624, 625, 641, 643, 644, 648, 649, 657, 660, 664, 669, 707
- Rational Choice 62, 67
- Reactance 145, 196, 199, 293, 296, 297, 302, 436, 447, 487, 497–512, 657, 668
- Reaction 22, 23, 25, 33, 47–49, 179, 215, 222, 223, 225, 237, 245, 274, 312, 314, 333, 339, 344, 351, 353, 354, 356, 359, 361, 396, 411, 427, 445, 497, 503, 505, 511, 521, 670, 694
- Reading 26, 31, 34, 50, 72, 85, 87, 91, 110, 114, 134, 153, 172, 187, 205, 219, 222, 226, 242, 246, 263, 273, 276–281, 284, 291, 303, 323, 331, 344, 363, 384, 391, 395, 396, 401, 419, 437, 455, 473, 488, 502, 511, 520, 525, 540, 541, 563, 565, 575, 583, 591–595, 603, 606–608, 624, 625, 629, 644–646, 650, 656, 657, 664, 669, 685, 712, 718
- Realism 48, 71, 400, 465, 467–473
  - External 470
  - Perceived 468–473
  - Semantic 469
  - Syntactic 469
- Reality 66, 67, 70, 80, 89, 90, 147, 182, 197, 216, 217, 235, 272, 276, 295, 299, 344, 372, 384, 394, 398, 400, 416, 417, 426, 452, 453, 465, 466, 468–473, 581, 606, 621, 641, 685, 708–710
- Reality TV 465
- Real Time Response Measurement 297, 341
- Reappraisal 49
- Recall 21, 27, 31, 32, 279, 294, 315, 317, 318, 320, 334, 410
- Reciprocal 68, 79–81, 88, 224, 273, 378, 379, 416, 427–429, 571
- Recognition 30, 32, 42, 523, 607, 643, 644, 713
- Recommendations 145, 169, 254, 429, 436, 563, 707–711, 714–717
- Recreation 596
- Regulatory compatibility 391

- Relationship 45, 48, 84, 86, 89, 105, 125, 127, 129, 131, 134, 160, 163, 165, 169, 181, 193, 195, 198, 199, 251–253, 255, 257, 261–263, 273, 274, 281, 297, 334–336, 342, 361, 372, 375, 378, 390–392, 397, 410, 413, 414, 416, 417, 426, 428, 430–433, 435, 446, 447, 449, 451, 471, 472, 484, 485, 488, 507, 519, 535–537, 571, 572, 580, 592, 594, 600, 606, 607, 629, 669, 675, 701, 710
  - Parasocial relationship 426, 428, 430, 432, 433, 507
  - Relationship development 335, 431, 433
  - Relationship strength 433, 519
- Relaxation 143, 197, 332, 342, 380, 596, 641, 666, 698
- Resonance 197, 241, 295, 312, 323, 332, 409, 410, 416–419, 432
- Resource allocation 26
- Riepl's Law 606
- Rituals 63, 65, 66, 104, 201, 202, 359, 624, 629, 664, 666
  - Ritual media use 65
- Romanticism 40
- Roper question 481
- Rubicon Model 63, 64

## S

- Sad-Film-Paradox 49
- Satisfaction 67, 85, 86, 89, 105, 111, 186, 351, 362, 430, 453, 454, 621, 695, 700, 711
- Satisficing 63, 195
- Scenes 42, 80, 113, 315, 333, 360, 416, 580, 663, 710
- Schematic Model of the Interplay of Media Use and Well-being 186
- Schemes 29
- Second-order media 556
- Secondary use 600
- Second screening 32, 693, 694, 696, 698, 699
- Selection
  - De facto selectivity 167, 169, 171
  - Media selection 82, 141, 145, 149, 151, 164, 169, 171, 177, 184–187, 193, 194, 198, 200, 201, 204, 252, 253, 255, 257, 262, 263, 344, 557, 560
  - Selection behaviour 67, 81, 201, 245, 251, 252, 557
- Selective attention 23, 177, 193, 453
- Selective exposure 140, 159, 164–172, 177, 179, 183, 187, 251–253, 255, 257, 258, 262, 263, 505
  - Selective Exposure Approach 177, 179
- Self-concept 183, 254, 318, 411, 414, 448, 451, 452, 521–524
- Self-consistency 183
- Self-determination 184, 354, 508, 510, 533–535, 537, 539, 636, 646
- Self-Determination Theory 85, 177, 184, 498
- Self-efficacy 65, 70, 145, 149, 150, 152, 196, 204, 295, 297
- Self-esteem 196, 204, 254, 451–454, 522, 523
  - Self-esteem enhancement 451, 452
- Self-image 108, 111, 184, 254, 413, 414, 417, 427, 451, 453, 523
- Self-improvement 183, 454

- Self-perception 48, 111, 183, 450, 517, 520, 522, 524  
Self-persuasion 517, 520, 522, 524  
Self-referencing 396, 410  
Self-regulation 102, 103, 150, 647, 691, 697, 700, 701  
Self-transcendence 355  
Self-transcendent emotions 302, 351, 358–360, 362, 363  
– Admiration 340, 351, 361  
– Awe 351, 360, 380  
– Elevation 301, 355, 360–362  
– Gratitude 43, 351, 352, 358, 360, 361  
– Kama muta 361  
Self-transcendent experiences 355, 356  
Self presence 398  
Semantic memory 27, 312  
Sensation Seeking 66, 193, 194, 202, 203, 343  
Serious games 392  
Shit storms 71  
Siblings 576, 663, 670  
Signalling principle 283  
Situational context 163, 222, 302, 341, 377, 667, 680, 681  
Situation Model 271, 272, 275–280, 394, 398, 399, 401, 470  
Smartphones 21, 65, 103, 121, 122, 130, 145, 181, 409, 497, 578, 606, 625, 627–629, 640, 669, 675–678, 680–683, 685, 691–695, 698, 700, 711  
Social  
– Social action 61, 66, 109, 426, 572, 576, 593, 617  
– Social anxiety 194, 320  
– Social change 70, 581, 595, 602, 619, 621, 629, 659  
– Social Cognitive Theory 139, 149, 150  
– Social control and monitoring mechanisms 67  
– Social groups 69, 70, 104, 107, 111, 114, 123, 130, 161, 215, 225, 311, 317, 321, 450, 532, 540, 551, 577–579, 655, 659, 699  
– Social media 34, 46, 50, 68, 71, 79, 81, 83, 85, 86, 101, 123, 142, 144, 150, 169, 171, 181, 195–202, 205, 213, 214, 219, 221, 251, 260–263, 291–294, 352, 353, 358, 359, 364, 391, 428, 429, 436, 443, 450, 452–454, 485, 497, 498, 501, 506, 507, 511, 517, 519, 522, 525, 571, 574, 578, 600, 606, 622, 627, 647–649, 664, 669, 682, 693–695, 698, 699, 701, 707, 709, 711, 712, 717, 718  
– Social media platform 79, 83, 85, 86, 101, 169, 213, 485, 506, 693, 707, 709, 711, 712, 717, 718  
– Social milieus 69  
– Social movements 238, 239, 563, 571, 572, 579, 580, 582  
– Social perception 443  
– Social pressure 151, 695  
– Social situation 44, 107, 108, 114, 143, 183, 203, 693, 699  
– Social trust 483, 486  
Socialisation 60, 90, 104, 113, 114, 161, 381, 419, 483, 488, 574, 576, 577, 617–619, 621, 623, 626, 629, 659  
Socio-economic potential 607  
Spatial contiguity principle 283  
Spoiled pleasure 698  
Streaming services 71, 90, 103, 110, 143, 151, 351, 558, 617, 622, 693, 707, 709, 711, 712, 715, 717  
Stress 27, 142, 180, 333, 336, 339, 342, 358, 362, 429, 497, 536, 661, 697, 700  
Subjective freedoms 497–507, 509–511  
Subjective sensation 389  
Sublimity 351, 355  
Suppression 49, 658  
Surprise 42, 47, 297, 301, 333, 338, 339, 380  
Surveys 39, 90, 114, 142, 147, 159, 169, 170, 226, 237, 432, 433, 483, 488, 538, 561, 591, 592, 600, 636, 646, 656, 715  
Synchronisation 195, 392, 397, 601, 668
- T**
- Task orientation 194  
Technology Acceptance Model 678  
Tension 21, 42, 244, 256, 272, 275, 331–333, 340–342, 344, 358, 362, 435, 471, 532, 580, 621  
Territorialisation 579  
Thematic point 275, 276  
Theory of Affect Dependent Stimulus Arrangement 179  
Theory of Mind 444  
Theory of Planned Behaviour 133, 150, 162, 677  
Theory of Reasoned Action 63, 148, 150, 151  
The public 252, 338, 481, 488, 595, 596, 601, 603, 604, 683, 700, 716  
Threat 25, 33, 44, 165, 196, 204, 294, 295, 297, 298, 318, 332, 335, 336, 339, 340, 344, 355, 375, 381, 497–503, 505, 507–509, 511, 512, 523, 604  
Three-Perspective Model for Distinguishing Between Reality and Fiction 469, 470  
Three Factor Theory of Emotion and Mood 178, 179  
Time budgets 603, 607, 659  
Top-down processing 25, 378  
TOTE units 62  
Traditionality 573  
Traits 48, 66, 83, 161, 163, 182, 193, 194, 204, 205, 241, 259, 273, 279, 295, 296, 301, 322, 343, 357, 360, 361, 394, 397, 400, 411–413, 429, 444, 445, 472, 480, 502, 503, 522, 531, 534, 535, 540, 677, 717  
Transcendence 351, 352, 355, 357–360, 362, 363  
Transformation 62, 113, 122, 130, 131, 204, 395, 573, 574, 583, 625  
Transitory social role 44  
Transportability 395, 397, 472  
Transportation 86, 87, 271, 337, 389, 393–397, 400, 467, 468, 471, 537, 663, 669, 697, 698  
– Transportation-Imagery Model 393, 395  
TV series 294, 465, 701  
Two-factor theory 42, 43  
Two-process model 353, 354, 411, 413, 415  
Two Factor Model of Emotion 178, 179  
Typicality 468, 471

## Index

---

### U

Ubiquity 625, 675, 693, 697, 699, 700  
Uncertainty 273, 323, 331–334, 336, 341, 342, 344, 375, 430, 509  
Understanding 21, 26, 42, 46, 59–61, 69, 90, 91, 101, 106, 112, 114, 127, 129, 131, 134, 140, 193, 214, 226, 234, 240, 241, 262, 263, 282, 297, 316, 333, 336, 339, 341, 344, 356, 374, 377, 395, 401, 410–419, 426, 427, 443, 446, 472, 482, 488, 504, 531–534, 572, 598, 622, 635, 637, 638, 641, 644, 645, 647, 663, 700, 701, 708, 713, 715, 717, 718  
Unique content 71  
Upheavals 105, 106, 129, 578, 607, 620, 629  
Urgency 64, 472, 658  
Usefulness 67, 123, 124, 141, 151, 167, 253, 409, 410, 650, 658, 678, 714  
User-generated content 70, 517, 518  
Uses-and-Gratifications-Approach 67, 105, 169, 179, 679  
Utilisation  
– Self-determined use 71  
Utilisation niches 253, 680, 681, 685  
Utilisation of information 260

### V

Valence 39, 46, 83, 160, 166, 179, 180, 215–217, 220, 223, 281, 291, 298, 300–302, 390, 397, 428, 502, 504, 533

### Valuation theories 245

Value 40, 42, 62, 63, 67, 107, 108, 111, 131, 133, 140, 147–149, 151, 153, 161, 162, 184, 234, 239, 278, 302, 354, 360, 371, 375, 410, 411, 414, 418, 419, 437, 469, 471, 561, 563, 597, 599, 718  
Video games 50, 72, 79–83, 85, 86, 88, 91, 151, 294, 313, 314, 316, 317, 320, 322, 391, 392, 398, 428, 448, 465, 577, 578, 655–657, 664  
Virality 71, 358  
Virtual reality 70, 80, 398, 400  
Volition 64

### W

Wearables 676–678  
Wellbeing 621, 701  
Willing construction of disbelief 465, 467  
Willingness to express 521  
Willing suspension of disbelief 467  
Wishful identification 294, 443, 449, 450, 453  
Women 133, 181, 183, 199, 312, 343, 392, 397, 454, 485, 486, 557, 575, 594, 623, 628, 629, 663, 683, 684

### Y

YouTube 47, 153, 181, 356, 358, 555, 581, 600, 645, 693, 707, 710, 712